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ABSTRACT 
Looking across Borders: A Test of Spatial Policy Interdependence using 
Local Government Efficiency Ratings  
by Benny Geys * 
Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have 
received a lot of scholarly attention recently. Still, the focus on taxation or 
expenditure levels in previous studies is incomplete. In fact, (rational) individuals 
are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods 
provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive – 
thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policy (in relation to that of 
neighbouring jurisdictions) rather than concentrating on spending (or taxation) 
levels alone. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want 
their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Using 
Flemish local governments’ efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate tax 
revenues to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the 
existence of such neighbourhood effects in local government policies. 
 
Keywords: Government efficiency, Flemish municipalities, local government, spatial 
interdependence 
JEL Classification: D24, D60, H71, H72 
                                                 
*  The author is grateful to Ashish Chaturvedi, Hilde Coffé, Bruno Heyndels, Dan Kovenock, Jan 
Vermeir and his colleagues at the WZB for insightful comments.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Der Blick über die Grenze: Untersuchung von räumlichen Wechsel-
beziehungen in der Kommunalpolitik anhand von Effizienzbewertungen  
In jüngster Zeit hat sich die Wissenschaft vermehrt für die räumlichen Muster 
der lokalen Besteuerung und Ausgabenentscheidungen interessiert. Dabei hat 
man sich in neueren Studien jedoch hauptsächlich auf die Betrachtung von 
Besteuerung und Ausgabenhöhe konzentriert. Diese Betrachtungsweise greift 
zu kurz, denn der (rationale) Bürger betrachtet die Höhe der öffentlichen 
Ausgaben (oder die Steuern dafür) und vergleicht, wie viel öffentliche Güter er 
eigentlich dafür bekommt. Er beurteilt also eher das Preis/Mengen-Verhältnis 
der Lokalpolitik im Vergleich zu den benachbarten Kommunen, als sich allein 
auf die Höhe der Ausgaben oder der Besteuerung zu konzentrieren. Es lässt 
sich zeigen, dass Amtsinhaber ein Preis/Mengenverhältnis anstreben, das dem 
der benachbarten Kommunen ähnlich ist. Die Auswertung von Daten aus dem 
Jahr 2000, die die Effizienz flämischer Lokalpolitik anhand des Verhältnisses 
von Steuereinnahmen zu lokal bereitgestellten öffentlichen Gütern bemessen, 
bestätigt die Existenz solcher Nachbarschaftseffekte in der Kommunalpolitik. 
 Introduction 
 
Since the seminal contributions of Salmon (1987) and Case et al. (1989; 1993), spatial patterns in 
(local) governments’ taxation and spending decisions have received a great deal of scholarly 
attention.  Generally, empirical analyses indicate that governments do not take their taxation 
and expenditure decisions in isolation (for reviews, see Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005).  
Various theoretical explanations of this interdependence have been brought forward.  Some 
scholars refer to the beneficial or harmful externalities created by policies in one region on 
neighbouring regions (e.g. Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Solé-Ollé, 2006).  Others point to 
intergovernmental competition over a mobile tax base (e.g. Wilson, 1999; Buettner, 2001).  A 
third group argues that policy “mimicking” can be rational for politicians when voters engage 
in relative performance assessment using the policies pursued by neighbouring governments 
as a yardstick.1  On the one hand, this can lead to a form of yardstick competition between 
neighbouring governments when voters use neighbours’ performance to judge the competence 
of their own government (e.g. Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995).  On the other hand, as 
argued by Ashworth and Heyndels (2000a), relative performance assessment might also affect 
voting behaviour (and thereby politicians’ incentives to “mimic”) because it generates so-called 
transaction (dis)utility to voters (Thaler, 1985) – which reflects the gain (loss) felt by voters in 
considering local policies to be better (worse) than the reference point. 
  
While regarding various settings and time periods, one constant in previous empirical analyses 
of spatial interdependence is that they have concentrated on either taxation or expenditure 
levels.  However, regarding taxation or spending levels in isolation disregards the fact that 
(rational) voters are likely to assess the costs of public goods provision relative to the level of 
public goods that is actually provided by the government.  That is, they can be expected to 
regard the ‘price/quantity’ of public provisions (whether or not in relation to that of 
neighbouring governments) rather than make assessments based on the level of taxation or 
government spending alone.  Solé Ollé (2003, 686, italics added), for example, claims that “in a 
decentralised system, a means of demonstrating to voters that a tax increase is necessary is to 
show that taxes are higher elsewhere for the same benefits provided”.  And Brueckner (2003, 178, 
italics added) argues that “a minimum level of public good provision relative to taxes (…) must 
be delivered for jurisdiction i’s government to remain in office”. 
 
The present paper argues that the narrow focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous 
work is not entirely satisfactory.  Indeed, building on the notion that voters assess the 
‘price/quantity’ of public provisions, we first illustrate that the ratio of tax revenues to public 
goods provision in a given jurisdiction is dependent upon that in neighbouring jurisdictions.  
We then empirically test this proposition using the relation between Flemish municipal 
governments’ total tax revenues and their level of public goods provisions in the year 2000 as 
our main dependent variable.  This dependent variable thus indicates how efficiently tax 
revenues are employed to generate public goods and can be interpreted as an indicator for the 
‘price/quantity’ of local governments’ policies.2  Our empirical results reveal the existence of a 
significant spatial pattern in local government efficiency ratings.  Indeed, efficiency at one local 
government is associated with efficiency at its (geographical) neighbours.  Interestingly, and in 
                                                 
1  In line with most previous empirical analyses of spatial policy interdependence, ‘neighbourhood’ is 
in the present paper interpreted as geographical proximity.  Obviously, other interpretations are 
possible (e.g. in terms of similarity in socio-economic characteristics, government ideology or inter-
area population mobility) (e.g. Braicker, 2005). 
2  To the best of our knowledge, the possibility of spatial interdependence in government efficiency 
ratings has not previously been explored.  Such analyses have focused on a jurisdiction’s own socio-
economic and political characteristics (for a review, see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). 
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 contrast to some previous work, the presence of this spatial pattern is only weakly related to 
the political situation in the Flemish municipalities. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The first section describes the theoretical 
framework.  Our main extension to the existing theoretical work is that the ratio of tax 
revenues to public goods provision is central to interjurisdictional comparisons, rather than tax 
rates or expenditure levels as such.  In the remaining sections, we empirically assess this 
proposition by testing for spatial patterns in the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision 
across Flemish local governments.  Specifically, section 2 provides information about the 
Flemish context.  The measurement of the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision 
(through local government efficiency ratings) is discussed in section 3.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical analysis and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
 
The literature examining spatial patterns in (local) governments’ fiscal policies is rapidly 
expanding.  Recent reviews of this literature by Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) indicate 
that fiscal decisions in neighbouring jurisdictions tend to play a prominent role in the decision 
to set ones own tax rate or level of public goods provision.  Several theoretical explanations 
have been suggested to explain this spatial interdependence: spillover effects, tax competition, 
yardstick competition and reference point effects.  In section 1.1, we briefly consider the main 
traits of each of these models.  Then, in section 1.2, we argue that the focus on either taxation or 
expenditure levels in previous theoretical and empirical studies may be unnecessarily 
restrictive.3  Instead, we suggest that the assessments of jurisdictions’ (relative) performance is 
based on the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision; thereby contending that this ratio 
will constitute an important competitive device between jurisdictions.  
 
1.1 Four models for fiscal interdependence 
 
As mentioned, four different theoretical models have been brought forward to explain the 
interdependence in policy outcomes across jurisdictions.  The first of these, the spillover 
model, points at the beneficial or harmful externalities created by policies in one region on the 
well-being of inhabitants in neighbouring regions (e.g. Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Solé-Ollé, 
2006).  Examples of such spillovers are numerous and include expenditures for recreational 
facilities, pollution prevention or public safety.  Due to such spillover effects, the optimal 
policy in each jurisdiction depends on the policies chosen in neighbouring regions.  
Technically, the reaction function of any jurisdiction i – representing i’s best response to 
choices in other jurisdictions – will have a non-zero slope (leading to a spatial pattern in the 
observed policies). 
 
The second framework, the tax competition model, argues that governments often compete 
over a mobile tax base (e.g. Wilson, 1999; Buettner, 2001).  This implies that they attempt to 
attract individuals (e.g. in case of income taxation) or firms (e.g. in case of profit taxation) 
through the taxation and spending decisions they make.  It is assumed that policies in all 
jurisdictions jointly determine the distribution of this mobile tax base across jurisdictions.  The 
reason is that when a firm or individual judges a certain region to be an optimal location for 
whatever reason (e.g. clean air, closeness to relatives or consumers, and so on), “there might 
                                                 
3  This argument appears harder to make for the spillover model.  Hence, the remainder of this work 
will focus on the three remaining alternatives. Still, as this allows us to empirically distinguish 
between the theoretical explanations of spatial interactions, this need not be regarded as problematic. 
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 still be some degrees of freedom in choosing the specific community” (Buettner, 2001, 226).  
This leaves some leeway for local communities to engage in competition to attract the mobile 
tax base through its policy agenda.  As a consequence, each jurisdiction is (indirectly) affected 
by the policies pursued in neighbouring jurisdictions.  Once again, jurisdiction i’s reaction 
function has a non-zero slope. 
 
A third group of scholars has brought forward that one jurisdiction may mimic policy 
decisions in neighbouring jurisdictions as a rational response of politicians to voters who 
employ the policies pursued by neighbouring governments as a yardstick to assess their own 
government’s competence (e.g. Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995).   The idea is that 
politicians are forced into a “yardstick competition” with neighbouring jurisdictions (cfr. 
Shleifer, 1985) because voters use these jurisdictions to assess the quality of their own 
incumbents.4  
 
Finally, Ashworth and Heyndels (2000a) argue that the use of neighbouring governments’ 
policies as a reference point generates so-called transaction (dis)utility to voters (cfr. Thaler, 
1985).  This transaction utility is the additional utility that people experience – besides the 
acquisition utility from a given policy in itself – from their consideration of this policy as good 
(or bad) relative to a reference point (in this case, neighbours’ policies).  As is well-known from 
prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), people tend to feel worse about a 25% 
income tax in the own jurisdiction when it is compared to a 20% income tax in neighbouring 
jurisdictions (for given levels of public goods) than when this tax is compared to a 30% income 
tax elsewhere.  The reason is that they not only consider the 25% income tax as such, but also 
the 5% gain (or loss) compared to neighbouring jurisdictions.  As this transaction utility is 
likely to also affect voting behaviour, the (rational) response of politicians is to follow each 
other’s lead. 
 
1.2 Government efficiency as a competitive device 
 
In presentations (and empirical tests) of these explanations of spatial patterns in government 
policies, the discussion is usually restricted to either tax rates or the level of expenditures on 
certain public goods.  While, as mentioned before, this is acceptable for the spillover model, it 
appears to be much less satisfactory for the remaining models.  Indeed, competition between 
jurisdictions – whether this derives from the urge to attract a mobile tax base or because voters 
engage in relative performance assessments – is not likely to be restricted to either taxation or 
expenditure levels.  In fact, Salmon (1987, 33n), in the first application of relative performance 
evaluation to decentralised governments, already argued that “it is important (…) that voters 
take into account burdens of taxation as well as public services”.  Though this increases the 
information load placed on the voter, it is a quite essential point and similar concerns have 
been voiced in later papers.5  Alt and Lassen (2006, 2), for example, argue that “voters want 
more competent politicians in office, as they can provide more public goods for given levels of 
taxation and private consumption” (see also the citations of Solé Ollé, 2003 and Brueckner, 
2003 in the introduction).   
 
                                                 
4  Interestingly, the ‘assumption’ that voters take policies in neighbouring jurisdictions into account and 
punish incumbents for relative underperformance finds considerable support in the literature 
assessing the political costs of taxation (e.g. Besley and Case, 1995; Bosch and Solé Ollé, 2004; Ågren, 
2005; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2005; see, however, Revelli, 2002a). 
5  Clearly, relative performance assessment relies on the individual’s ability to analyse all the necessary 
information, such that this increased information load is not of trivial importance.  We believe, 
however, that people generally have at least some impressions about the price/quantity of 
government provisions. 
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 Still, despite the recurrent expression of the need to regard what one pays (i.e. taxation or 
spending levels) and what one gets (i.e. the level of public goods provision), empirical analyses 
of spatial policy interdependence have continued to focus on taxation or spending levels in 
isolation.  Note, however, that such a strict focus on, say, (relative) tax rates implicitly assumes 
that residents are more likely to accept higher tax rates in their own jurisdiction (or, at least, 
that the electoral retribution for these increases will be lower) when taxes have increased in 
neighbouring jurisdictions – even when the provision of public goods has increased in these 
neighbouring jurisdictions and remained constant in ones own jurisdiction.  The reason is that 
voters concentrating exclusively on tax rate developments do not consider this unequal 
development in public goods provided.  Intuitively, this makes little sense.   
 
Let us turn to a more stylized formulation of the argument.6 Consider a situation where 
politicians only care about being re-elected.  This preference might derive from a (possibly 
altruistic) desire to hold office and fend for the common good (’good’ politicians) or from a 
craving to be in a position to extract as much rent as possible (‘bad’ politicians).  The 
probability of being re-elected, however, depends on the incumbent’s performance while in 
office.  Evidently, the better one performs in the eyes of the electorate, the higher the chances of 
being re-elected.  As voters are happier – and thus become more likely to re-elect their 
incumbent – when their utility level increases, politicians’ preferences in any jurisdiction i 
( ) can be given by: PiU
 
P
iU = U( , p
V
iU i)  (1) 
 
where  stands for the representative voter’s utility level, pViU i indicates the utility politicians 
obtain from being in office (which can, but need not, derive from rent extraction) and 
superscripts P and V refer to the politician and the voter respectively.  Assume further that 
voters want to maximise their utility and that this utility depends on private consumption (ci), 
the level of public goods provided by the government (gi) and a number of jurisdiction 
characteristics (zi); such that  
 
V
iU = U(ci, gi, zi)  (2) 
 
Public goods are financed entirely through taxation, the cost of which is distributed equally 
over the jurisdiction’s population.  Therefore private consumption (ci) is determined by income 
(yi) minus the tax payment (ti) contributed towards the financing of public goods.  The private 
budget constraint thus looks like: ci = yi - ti.  Maximization of (2) implies that voters prefer to 
obtain as much public goods as possible for a given tax payment (or, equivalently, pay as little 
taxes as possible for a given amount of public goods).   
 
Public goods are provided by politicians who, as mentioned, can be either good or bad.  Good 
politicians set the tax price of public goods equal to their cost while bad politicians try to 
extract as much rents as possible by setting the tax price of public goods above their costs.  
Crucially, however, voters cannot observe the minimal cost for providing public goods.  This 
cost is stochastic and is only observed by the incumbent.  Hence, while voters cannot gauge the 
maximum tax payment that should be associated with a given amount of public goods, 
politicians do.  This asymmetric information problem presents the possibility for politicians to 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour.  It can, however, be alleviated when voters take into account 
                                                 
6  For reasons of space, we only develop the argument for the yardstick competition framework though 
it is clear that a similar reasoning holds for the tax competition model and the reference points effects 
explanation.  The exposition here builds on Besley and Case (1995) and Brueckner (2003).   
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 the behaviour of politicians in neighbouring jurisdictions.  Indeed, when cost shocks in the 
provision of public goods are correlated across jurisdictions, the behaviour of other 
jurisdictions can provide valuable information about the quality of ones incumbent.7  In fact, 
when, all other things being equal, the level of taxes relative to public goods is higher in ones 
own jurisdiction compared to that in neighbouring jurisdictions – that is, when ti/gi > t-i/g-i –
the incumbent in the home jurisdiction is likely to be extracting rents (or might be extracting 
more rents than incumbents elsewhere).  Therefore, they want to replace their incumbent at the 
next elections.  For any given incumbent the probability of being re-elected (Pri) thus not only 
depends on the ratio of tax revenues to public good provision in ones own jurisdiction (ti/gi), 
but also on that same ratio in neighbouring jurisdictions (t-i/g-i).  That is: 
 
Pri = f(ti/gi, t-i/g-i, zi)  (3) 
 
where zi refers to a vector of characteristics of jurisdiction i that help determine preferences.  
The incumbent in jurisdiction i chooses the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision 
(ti/gi) such as to maximize the probability of re-election.  The first order condition of this 
problem can be (re)written as: 
 
ti/gi  = R(t-i/g-i, zi)   (4) 
 
where R represents a reaction function defining the optimal reaction of jurisdiction i (in terms 
of setting its ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision).  It is clear that this depends on 
both (t-i/g-i) and zi and, that is, on choices made in other jurisdictions and jurisdiction i’s 
characteristics.  In empirical applications, testing for a non-zero slope of this reaction function 
is effectively a test for the presence of spatial interdependence in the fiscal decisions of 
incumbents. 
 
 
2. Institutional setting 
 
The Flemish municipal setting offers a number of advantages to test the proposition outlined 
in section 1.2.  Firstly, the institutional setting is the same in all municipalities.  They all have 
the same parliamentary system and hold elections at the same point in time (i.e. the second 
Sunday of October) using the same electoral procedures.  More specifically, local governments 
consist of the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body) and the local council (the 
legislative body).  Councillors are chosen via municipal elections that take place once every six 
years and can be indefinitely re-elected (that is, there are no term limits).  Following the 
election, the party (or coalition of parties) that controls a majority of the seats in the council 
decides on the composition of the executive board.  The political system in the Flemish 
municipalities can thus be characterized as a parliamentary system where the executive board 
is formed by a political majority.  Importantly, this homogeneous setting allows us to analyse 
spatial policy interdependence without needing to control for differing institutional factors.   
 
                                                 
7  The assumption of correlated cost shocks is crucial.  Nothing can be learned from neighbouring 
government’s reactions to different cost shocks.  Still, certainly for smaller jurisdictions, cost shocks 
might well be correlated in reality.  Importantly, however, it also assumes that politicians do not 
make agreements concerning the degree of rent extraction they pursue.  Clearly, if all politicians 
agree to provide public goods at, say, twice their minimum cost, voters cannot learn the true level of 
wasted resources by regarding other jurisdictions.  Though such collusion is clearly a theoretical 
possibility, it is doubtful whether it could also arise in reality.  Uncertainty about the tolerance of 
rent-seeking behaviour across politicians may limit the occurrence of such political ‘cartels’. 
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 Secondly, though the municipalities are the lowest level of government in Belgium (next to the 
national, regional and provincial levels), they have considerable autonomy in raising revenues 
and assume significant responsibilities at the expenditure side (e.g. in education, local 
infrastructure, public safety, social services and local public administration).  In fact, Flemish 
local governments are allowed to pursue any policy that promotes their constituents’ interests 
– and to determine how they finance these initiatives – provided these initiatives are not 
prohibited explicitly by federal legislation.  This significant autonomy clearly shows from two 
elements in the revenue structure of the Flemish local governments.  On the one hand, while 
surcharge taxes on the regional property tax (i.e. the local property tax, LPT) and the federal 
personal income tax (i.e. the local income tax, LIT) constitute a main revenue source of Flemish 
municipalities (about 83% of total tax income in 2000), significant variation exists in the extent 
to which the municipalities use these two revenue sources.  Indeed, in the fiscal year 2000, the 
LIT rate varied between 0% and 8.5% of federal tax receipts while the minimum and maximum 
LPT rates were equal to 438% and 2000% of the regional tax respectively.  This implies that 
inhabitants pay a supplement equal to approximately 5 to 20 times their regional government 
property tax bill (and 0-8.5 percent of their federal personal income tax bill) to the local 
government.  Note that while the major part of income taxation thus accrues to the federal 
government rather than local governments, these local governments absorb the main part of 
property taxation in Flanders.  Second, the average Flemish municipality collects about 15 
different ‘local’ taxes, for which the tax base as well as the tax rate is determined by the local 
government (whereas they only set the tax rate for the surcharge taxes).  Currently, more than 
100 of such local taxes are in use and the list includes taxes on private swimming pools, on the 
distribution of telephone books, on transportation of drunken persons, on boats and so on.   
 
Finally, the relatively small size of the Flemish municipalities (44 km² on average) may 
constitute another beneficial element.  Indeed, when the distance to ones reference group 
influences the ease of gathering information about the conditions in this reference group, the 
closeness of the neighbouring jurisdictions in the Flemish context entails that obtaining 
information about these neighbours is fairly easy.  As such, the assessment of relative 
performance becomes feasible (thereby at the same time giving politicians an incentive to take 
neighbours’ policies into account).   
 
We should note here that these three elements have prompted several studies on spatial 
interdependence to use Flemish (and, by extension, Belgian) data.  Heyndels and Vuchelen 
(1998), for example, show that a statistically significant spatial pattern exists in both LIT and 
LPT rates across Belgian municipalities.  This suggests that incumbents take into account tax 
rates in neighbouring jurisdictions when setting their own rates.  This is further corroborated 
by survey evidence in Flanders (Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997, 2000b).  Specifically, local 
politicians’ evaluation of how high (or low) local tax burdens are as well as their view on the 
need for tax increases (or decreases) is found to depend on the tax rates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions (see also Heyndels and Ashworth, 2003).  Finally, Vermeir and Heyndels (2005, 
12) show that voters in Flemish municipalities “use tax rates in neighbouring municipalities as 
a yardstick to evaluate tax policy in their own municipalities”.  This implies that politicians’ 
mimicking behaviour may well be a rational reaction to the fact that voters assess local tax 
policies relative to that in neighbouring municipalities. 
 
 
3. Determining Flemish local government efficiency 
 
As mentioned in section 1, the present paper differs from previous research by focusing on the 
ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision as the indicator used for relative performance 
assessments (rather than concentrating on either tax rates or expenditure levels).  In the 
6 
 empirical analysis (presented in section 4), this ratio is measured by relating the government’s 
total tax revenues to its provision of public goods (and which we term local government 
efficiency).  High efficiency signifies that the government needs only few (tax) resources to 
generate high levels of public goods while low efficiency indicates that high taxation levels are 
associated with low levels of public good provision.  As such, it indicates how effective the 
incumbent government is in translating tax revenues into public goods – or, reversely, how 
strongly it indulges in rent-seeking behaviour.  Hence, these efficiency ratings provide a way to 
operationalise the voter’s actual cost-benefit assessment of the government’s performance. 
 
Several methods have been brought forward in the literature to measure efficiency (for an 
excellent introduction, see Lovell, 1993).  In the present analysis, we employ a stochastic 
parametric reference technology.  This implies that we determine the best practice frontier, 
which contains the input-output combinations designating optimal or efficient behaviour, on 
the basis of a specific functional form using econometric techniques.  Moreover, contrary to 
deterministic approaches, the stochastic approach to efficiency measurement does not interpret 
any deviation from the best practice frontier as inefficiency, but rather differentiates between 
the effects of measurement error and inefficiency (Aigner et al., 1977 and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck, 1977).  This allows us to limit the attribution of measurement error to inefficiency, 
which should therefore lead to a more accurate assessment of (in)efficiency.  Technically, such 
stochastic frontier models have a composed error consisting of a symmetric component (u) and 
a one-sided non-negative component (e) that represents inefficiency.  While the former 
component is assumed to be white noise, the latter is assumed to be distributed half-normally 
(cfr. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).  Both error terms are assumed to be independent (Kuenzle, 
2005).  Employing a translogarithmic function (developed by Christensen et al., 1973) and 
assuming a multiplicative composite error term, the stochastic frontier model from which we 
derive our efficiency data can be written as (dropping municipality subscripts for 
convenience): 
 
 ln T = a + k
n
j j
n
k jkj
n
j j
yyy ∑ ∑∑ = == + 1 11 lnln21ln λβ  + u + e  (5) 
 
where T designates the input indicator, yj indicates the output indicators, n points to the 
number of outputs in the model and βj and λ jk are parameters to be estimated.8  Specifically, 
we rely on data from 305 of 308 Flemish municipal governments in the year 2000 to estimate 
local government efficiency ratings.9  Our input variable equals total tax revenues in the 
municipality.  These revenues represent the (direct) cost to the voter from the public goods 
provided by the incumbent.10  To measure the level of local public goods provision, we include 
five output variables that have been employed in previous work on government efficiency in 
Flemish (and Belgian) municipalities (see Vanden Eeckaut et al., 1993; De Borger et al., 1994; De 
Borger and Kerstens, 1996).  These include: (a) the number of subsistence grants beneficiaries, 
(b) the number of students in local primary schools, (c) the share of inhabitants older than 65, 
                                                 
8  Information on variation in input prices was not available (so that input prices are ignored).  For the 
same reason it was not possible to control for differences in the quality of the output variables.  
However, since differences in the tax price to public goods ratio related to changes in the public 
good’s quality should not instigate voter hostility, disregarding quality is likely to generate an 
underestimate of the sensitivity of jurisdictions to each other’s policies (Besley and Case, 1995). 
9  Data availability precluded the inclusion of the remaining 3 municipalities. 
10  Note that more public goods could be provided at a given tax price when incumbents defer the costs 
of these expenditures to later periods by incurring debts – thereby artificially increasing their 
efficiency ratings.  Importantly, however, as local governments in Belgium are only allowed to incur 
debts to finance large investment projects and not for current spending, deficit spending is unlikely to 
significantly affect our results. 
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 (d) the total population and (e) the surface of public recreational facilities (measured in 
hectare).  These output variables relate to important responsibilities of local governments with 
respect to education and social and recreational services.  Nevertheless, and as more 
extensively discussed in De Borger et al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996), they are 
only crude proxies for the level of public goods provision.  For example, the number of 
subsistence grants beneficiaries and total population are clearly not directly measuring local 
public good production, but rather serve as indicators for the services provided to low-income 
families and the various administrative tasks performed by the local government respectively.  
This, regrettably, reflects the general problem with defining and measuring public sector 
inputs and outputs (cfr. Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).11   
 
We use the results from the cost frontier estimation of equation (5) to generate a measure for 
government efficiency using the procedure outlined in Jondrow et al. (1982).12  They 
particularly recommend to generate point estimates for the inefficiency element in the error 
component in equation (5) based on the mean of the conditional distribution (SF-Mean = E(u|u 
+ e)).  The efficiency measure resulting from this procedure will be used as our proxy for the 
ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision in the empirical analysis in the following 
section.13    
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1  Empirical Specification 
 
In this section we turn to the question whether our government efficiency rating (i.e. SF-Mean) 
demonstrates a spatial pattern across the Flemish municipalities.  This would be expected if, as 
argued in section 1, these efficiency ratings (as an indicator for the ‘price/quantity’ of local 
governments’ policies) are central to the competitive behaviour of rivalling jurisdictions.  As a 
starting point, assume that the reaction function derived in section 1 (equation 4) can be 
characterized by the following spatial lag model:  
 
SF-Mean = α + ρW SF-Mean + βX + ε  (6) 
 
where α, ρ and β are parameters to be estimated, X represents a vector of control variables 
(further discussed below) and W is a square row-normalized spatial weights matrix indicating 
whether or not two municipalities are neighbours.  Neighbours are thereby defined in a purely 
geographical sense as two municipalities that share a border.  The entries in each row of this 
matrix are thus 1/n (with n the number of neighbours of the municipality in row r) when the 
municipality in row r shares a border with the municipality in column c and 0 otherwise.  The 
                                                 
11  Panel data could admittedly be a help in resolving some of the problems related to these 
measurement issues (e.g. by allowing us to test the robustness of the empirical results).  
Unfortunately, time series data were not available for several of our output variables.  Nor could we 
add the efficiency ratings generated by previous Belgian studies to our sample as these were derived 
either from all Belgian municipalities or from the Walloon municipalities only, while our data are 
restricted to the Flemish municipalities. 
12  Note that the translogarithmic specification of the best practice frontier significantly outperforms the 
traditional Cobb-Douglas model.  Indeed, the restriction that the coefficients for all quadratic terms 
and cross-products equals 0 can be strongly rejected (Chi²(15) = 26.75; p<0.001). 
13  We also estimated tax efficiency using a number of other well-known approaches: Free Disposal 
Hull, Data Envelopment Analysis assuming constant or variable returns to scale and a deterministic 
parametric frontier approach. The outcomes using the various approaches are highly correlated 
(r>0.75) such that our results are unlikely to be affected by our choice of efficiency measurement. 
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 simple and intuitively appealing border-sharing criterion we employ is the most common 
approach in the literature.  It can be justified by referring to the fact that proximity is likely to 
be a crucial element in the dissemination of information about local policies (Allers and 
Elhorst, 2005).  Moreover, distance is significantly negatively linked to migration flows, 
indicating that “people prefer to move short distances if at all” (Day, 1992, 135).  Hence, 
spatially contiguous neighbours may be the most important ‘competitors’.  Finally, we note 
that as local governments in Flanders publicly discuss their policies – that is, council meetings 
are open to the public (except when personnel issues are discussed) – the actual tax and 
spending decisions of neighbours are assumed to be observable.  Therefore, we employ the 
contemporaneous ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision in the competing 
jurisdictions in the estimation of the model (see also Buettner, 2001; Revelli, 2001; 2002b; 
Bordignon et al., 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
 
Generally, a positive and significant coefficient estimate of ρ can be interpreted as evidence of 
competition in local government efficiency ratings across the Flemish municipalities.  
Importantly, however, spatially correlated omitted variables or the existence of common 
shocks across municipalities may cause the estimate of ρ to be spuriously significant.  In that 
case, the true model would rather look like: 
 
 SF-Mean = α + βX + ε    with ε = λWε + v (7) 
 
where v is an independently and identically distributed error term.  Clearly, when spatial 
interdependence is driven only by such common shocks, no evidence in support of our main 
thesis is revealed.  Another problem when estimating equation (6) is that OLS estimation leads 
to biased and inconsistent estimates due to the simultaneity in the determination of SF-Mean 
across jurisdictions (Cliff and Ord, 1973).  Instead, one should use either instrumental variables 
analysis (IV) or maximum likelihood estimation (ML) (see Anselin, 1988).  Though IV-
estimation has been argued to be somewhat less efficient than its ML counterpart (e.g. Das et 
al., 2003), it has the advantage of providing consistent results even in the presence of spatial 
error correlation (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998).  It is thus important to take both these 
methodological issues into account when analysing spatial patterns in government efficiency 
across the Flemish municipalities.  We more extensively return to these issues when discussing 
the empirical results in section 4.2. 
 
Our set of control variables (X) includes both socio-economic and political elements that may 
influence the municipality’s efficiency rating (summary statistics for all variables are provided 
in table 1).  All these variables are measured in 2000, except where noted otherwise.  Firstly, we 
include income per capita in the municipality.  Based on the argument that high-income 
citizens might be “more effective in demanding more efficient government” (Knack, 2002, 777), 
we expect a positive relation with government efficiency ratings.  Secondly, we control for the 
share of owner-occupiers in the population.  As homeownership entails a significant financial 
investment and local government policies are likely to influence housing prices (Oates, 1969; 
Reback, 2005), it is likely to encourage citizens to insist on efficient government behaviour 
(Green and White, 1997; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999).  This leads us to expect a positive 
relation between homeownership and government efficiency ratings.14  Thirdly, we include 
population density – measured as the number of inhabitants per 100 square kilometres – to 
control for possible economies of scale in the supply of (local) public goods.  The fourth and 
                                                 
14  Data availability leads us to use 1991 data on the percentage of houses with a known resident that are 
occupied by the owner.  Note that this time-lag also mitigates the potential reverse causality problem 
that arises if citizens are more likely to buy (rather than rent) housing accommodation in efficiently 
run municipalities.  We are grateful to Robert Nuscheler for this insight.  
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 final socio-economic control measures the number of pre-1977 communities that make up the 
present municipality.  Following a large-scale municipal amalgamation operation in Belgium 
in 1976, most current ‘municipalities’ are composed of several pre-1977 ‘communities’.  
Crucially, inhabitants of the various pre-1977 communities may still identify with this initial 
community (for a similar identification argument, see Lago Penas, 2004; Geys, 2006).  The 
ensuing ‘intra-municipality’ struggle may reduce overall efficiency of government 
performance – leading us to expect a negative relation between the number of per-1977 
municipalities and local government efficiency. 
 
We furthermore include two variables controlling for the financial situation of the 
municipality.  On the one hand, the lagged level of long-term local public debt (measured as a 
share of total municipal revenues) gauges the strain of past (investment) decisions on 
municipal finances.  While loans allow a municipality to spread its investment costs over the 
(economic) lifetime of the investment, interest and amortization of incurred debts must be paid 
out of the present budget.  Hence, a given level of taxation then translates into lower levels of 
(non-durable) public goods provided in the current period (leading us to expect a negative 
relation between the lagged level of debt and government efficiency).  On the other hand, 
grants awarded to the municipality by higher level governments allow it to supply more 
public goods for given tax income.  Therefore, we expect a positive relation between efficiency 
and the level of grants (also measured as a share of total municipal revenues). 
 
Finally, we introduce a set of political variables to control for a number of important 
characteristics of the local governments ruling in the year 2000 (and which were elected in 
1994).  The first of these political variables equals the effective number of parties in the 
governing coalition, measured as , with n the number of coalition partners and p∑ =ni ip1 2/1 i 
the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor and Aldermen (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).  
We expect a negative relation with the local government’s efficiency rating based on the 
argument that the level of government fragmentation increases the probability of government 
indecisiveness and gridlock (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Tsebelis, 1995).15  As Tsebelis (1995) 
and Volkerink and de Haan (2001) argue that a similar gridlock effect could well arise when 
the coalition partners have varying ideological standpoints, we also include a measure for the 
ideological fragmentation of the governing coalition.  This is measured as the standard 
deviation of the ideological positions of the coalition partners (Volkerink and de Haan, 2001).16  
The third political control variable is the government’s ideological position – defined as the 
weighed average ideological position of all government parties.17  This builds on the idea that 
right-wing politicians generally more fiercely support the workings of the market, while left-
wing politicians favour higher government intervention (see Hibbs, 1977; Tavares, 2004).  It is 
not a priori clear, however, how these different preferences would translate into higher (or 
lower) efficiency of the government itself.  
                                                 
15  To obtain a majority position in the local council, parties in Flemish municipalities often need to 
engage in coalition formation.  Recent evidence indicates that the size of these coalitions significantly 
affects local government decision-making (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2005, 2006; Goeminne et al., 2005).   
16  In mathematical terms, ideological fragmentation equals∑ = −ni ii ICGComplexionp1 )²)(( , where pi is 
the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor and Aldermen, Complexion refers to the ideological 
position of this party on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10) and ICG amounts to the weighted average 
ideological position of all government parties (see below).  The parties’ placement on the ideological 
scale is based on a self-placement survey among presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the 
municipalities.  The data derive from Deschouwer (1996) and range from 2.6 (Agalev) to 6.1 (VLD). 
17  Using definitions for n, pi and Complexion as before (see previous footnote), government ideology is 
measured as∑ .   =ni ii Complexionp1 ).(
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 ______________________ 
 
Table 1 about here 
______________________ 
 
4.2  Empirical results 
 
As previously mentioned, the analysis is based on data for the Flemish municipalities in the 
year 2000.  Due to data availability with respect to some of our control variables, this analysis 
is based on 301 observations.  The results are presented in table 2.  Columns (1)-(3) estimate the 
model including all control variables, while in columns (4)-(6) insignificant variables are 
deleted one by one to generate a more efficient model.   
______________________ 
 
Table 2 about here 
______________________ 
 
Columns (1) and (4) present a non-spatial model estimated by OLS.  However, the test statistic 
for Moran’s I is in both cases statistically significant at beyond the 1% level, such that the null 
hypothesis of no spatial effects can be rejected.  There thus appears to be a spatial pattern in the 
data.  Unfortunately, Moran’s I does not reveal whether a spatial lag model (in equation (6)) or 
a spatial error model (in equation (7)) is more appropriate.  The most likely source of the 
spatial pattern is, however, provided by the robust LM tests developed by Anselin et al. (1996).  
These tests are robust in the sense that the presence of spatial lag (error) dependence does not 
bias the results for the test on spatial error (lag) dependence.  The results – in the bottom row 
of table 2 – indicate that only the test for spatial lag dependence is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Based on these findings, a ML spatial lag model appears most appropriate 
and the results of these estimations are given are reported columns (2) and (5).18  Still, given 
that the presence of spatial error dependence cannot be rejected, only IV estimation may 
provide consistent results (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998).  These results are shown in columns (3) 
and (6), using neighbours’ socio-economic covariates as instruments for neighbours’ efficiency. 
 
The coefficient of central interest in these estimations is the parameter testing for a spatial lag 
in the dependent variable (ρ).  In both specifications, this parameter is statistically significantly 
different from 0, in line with the predictions from section 1.  The size of the coefficient indicates 
that a one percent higher efficiency rating in neighbouring municipalities is associated with an 
increase in ones own efficiency rating with 0.30-0.55 percent.  Hence, it appears that efficiency 
breeds efficiency.  Municipalities with more efficient neighbours tend to be more efficient 
themselves.  Importantly, to ensure that we are actually measuring spatial interdependence, 
we re-estimated the model using a weights matrix where neighbours are defined according to 
the alphabetical order of municipalities’ names (cfr. Case et al., 1993; Ågren, 2005; Brown and 
Rork, 2005).  Any given municipality thus is awarded one (or two) ‘neighbours’ preceding her 
in the alphabetical ordering and one (or two) ‘neighbours’ following her in this ordering.  Since 
this alphabetical ordering of municipalities has nothing to do with the competitive forces 
between them, the use of such a weighing scheme should not lead to significant estimates of 
the spatial parameter ρ.  Indeed, both when using one and two ‘neighbours’ on each side of a 
municipality in the alphabetical ordering, the estimations indicate the absence of spatial 
interactions.  This substantiates our claim that the results in table 2 are effectively capturing 
inter-municipality competition. 
                                                 
18  Note that the log-likelihood of the ML spatial lag model exceeds that of a ML spatial error model, 
further indicating that the spatial lag model is the most suitable model. 
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Referring back to the theoretical section, the spatial pattern established in table 2 could derive 
from competition over a mobile tax base or from politicians copying each others’ policies in 
response to voters’ relative performance assessments (i.e. yardstick competition and reference 
points effects models).  To distinguish between these explanations, it has been argued that the 
political context should be taken into account (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 2003; 
Solé-Ollé, 2003; Ågren, 2005; Allers and Elhorst, 2005).  Mimicking, so the argument goes, 
“should occur irrespective of re-election opportunities [if it] were due to tax competition” 
(Allers and Elhorst, 2005, 505), while the influence of political calculations on mimicking 
behaviour would provide support for the models that invoke electoral motives for politicians’ 
mimicking behaviour.  In other words, the crucial discriminating test rests on discovering 
discrepancies in politicians’ behaviour under different political and electoral conditions.  To 
investigate this in our setting, we test for differences in the size of the spatial interdependence 
parameter (ρ) depending on the level of political fragmentation in the municipality, the 
proportion of parties in power and the size of the governing majority.19  The reasons for 
expecting these variables to influence incumbent’s mimicking behaviour are as follows:  
? The ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis suggests that it is harder to assign blame to 
individual parties when the level of political fragmentation increases (Powell and Whitten, 
1993).  As acting on ones own desires is then politically less costly, fragmentation might 
reduce the extent of mimicking behaviour.  On the other hand, coalition members are 
generally less certain about their position after the following elections.  They not only need 
to win seats in the election, but also be successful in the ensuing coalition negotiations 
(Ashworth et al., 2006).  This additional uncertainty may rather increase their incentive to 
mimic other’s behaviour.  To test these hypotheses, we follow Solé-Ollé (2003) and separate 
our sample in coalitions and one-party governments (and, as an alternative, in governments 
with more and less than two parties).20 
? Parties’ probability of regaining power after future elections may be higher when a larger 
share of the parties that gain representation in the local council are also taken up in the local 
government.  The reason is that there are few alternative ways of forming a majority 
government.  Hence, even when the local government performs badly, incumbents are more 
certain of re-election.  We analyse whether in such a setting mimicking is less pervasive by 
splitting the sample in municipalities where the ‘proportion of parties in power’ is more (or 
less) than 0.5 (cfr. Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
? An alternative, and arguably somewhat more direct, indication of re-election odds is the 
size of the governing coalition.  Since politicians can (generally) be more confident of re-
election when they control a larger majority of the seats in the local council, we expect a 
lower need for mimicking behaviour under such circumstances (Bordignon et al., 2003; Solé-
Ollé, 2003; Ågren, 2005; Allers and Elhorst, 2005).  As a test for this hypothesis, we use the 
incumbent’s control of more than 60 percent (or, alternatively, 65 and 70 percent) of the 
council seats as the dividing criterion between the municipal governments.21   
 
The results are reported in table 3.  To preserve space, and because the results are 
quantitatively similar as in table 2, we suppress coefficient estimates for the control variables. 
                                                 
19  Technically, the spatial model is extended to allow for two regimes.  We are grateful to Paul Elhorst 
for sharing his Matlab routines that allow us to perform this analysis. 
20  Government fragmentation may, as argued in the literature on the Weak Government Hypothesis 
(e.g. Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Ashworth et al., 2005), also lead to legislative gridlock.  This is likely to 
affect people’s (or firm’s) decisions about moving in or out of the municipality and thereby also have 
its importance for the extent of governments’ mimicking behaviour in the tax competition model.  
Hence, the discriminating power of government fragmentation with respect to our three theories 
may only be weak.  We are grateful to Bruno Heyndels for pointing this out to us. 
21  Governments possessing higher seat shares are too few to allow for empirical testing. 
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 ______________________ 
 
Table 3 about here 
______________________ 
 
Table 3 shows that the political situation in the Flemish municipalities generally has only a 
minor effect on mimicking by incumbents.  Indeed, in only two of the six estimations does the 
difference between the spatial parameter of the two groups approach statistical significance at 
conventional levels.  Nonetheless, a number of observations tend to support the prediction that 
the probability of re-election affects incumbents’ incentive to copycat politicians in other 
jurisdictions.  Firstly, we find that the spatial parameter ρ is higher for large coalitions – in 
which parties are generally less certain about returning to power – than for coalitions with less 
than two parties.  This difference just fails to reach statistical significance at the ten percent 
level in the full model, but just surpasses this mark in the more efficient model (where 
insignificant variables are deleted one by one).  Secondly, our results show that the spatial 
parameter ρ is not statistically significantly different from 0 in municipalities where more than 
half of the parties in the local council are also part of the ruling government (i.e. PPP>0.5).  In 
municipalities where less than half of the parties are in the governing coalition, there is a 
significant spatial pattern.  Finally, turning to the effect of government’s seat share in the local 
council, we observe that the difference in the spatial parameters are mostly in the expected 
direction and, interestingly, diverge with increasing majorities.  The higher the governments’ 
majority, the lower the spatial parameter ρ becomes (and the larger the difference between the 
ρ’s of both groups).  Each of these three findings is in accordance with the idea that a higher 
probability of re-election is associated with lower apprehension with (and mimicking of) what 
happens in neighbouring jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, though electoral motives appears to play 
some role in explaining the spatial pattern in the data, the (lack of) strength of the results 
would indicate that they are not the main reason for the observed policy interdependence.  
 
Before turning to the conclusion, we make some brief remarks on the results of our control 
variables.  The findings here are mostly supportive of our expectations, though they often fail 
to reach statistical significance.  Significant support is found, however, for the hypothesis that a 
higher share of homeowners exerts a positive influence on government efficiency.  This is in 
line with the idea that homeowners not only reside longer in an area, but also have an 
important financial stake there (cfr. Oates, 1969; Reback, 2005) – making it more important for 
them to actually demand efficient government behaviour.  We also find that a higher number 
of pre-1977 communities in a municipality is negatively associated with efficiency.  This could 
indicate that the inhabitants of merged municipalities still (at least partly) identify with their 
old community (cfr. Lago Penas, 2004; Geys, 2006) and that the resulting ‘intra-municipality’ 
competition reduces overall efficiency.  Finally, and unsurprisingly, we find that higher grants 
are related to higher efficiency ratings (as less taxes are needed to finance a given level of 
public goods provision) while higher public debt is negatively related to government efficiency 
(as a larger part of tax revenues need to be used for interest and amortization payments). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Recent scholarship has recurrently shown that governments’ (fiscal) policies often display a 
spatial pattern.  High tax rates (spending levels) in one region tend to be associated with high 
tax rates (spending levels) in neighbouring regions and vice versa.  While various theoretical 
explanations of this policy interdependence have been proposed, most of these build on 
relative performance assessment by a region’s population (e.g. models of tax competition, 
yardstick competition and reference point effects).  Still, the exclusive focus of such models on 
13 
 either taxation or expenditure levels – a regularity that is also encountered in previous 
empirical work – is in our view uncalled for.  Indeed, (rational) individuals can be expected to 
take into account both the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision and the 
level of public goods in assessing their government’s policy agenda (whether or not they do so 
in relation to the policies of neighbouring governments).   
 
Building on this notion that voters use the ‘price/quantity’ of public provisions as a basis for 
relative performance assessments, we illustrate that this leads to an interdependence between 
the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision of a given jurisdiction and that of 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  An empirical test using Flemish municipal efficiency ratings in the 
year 2000 (which relate total tax revenues to the level of public goods provisions) as an 
indicator for the ‘price/quantity’ of local governments’ policies lends significant support for 
this proposition.  Indeed, the analysis uncovers a significant spatial pattern in Flemish local 
government’s efficiency ratings.  The attempt to distinguish what theoretical model 
particularly drives this pattern indicates that the models invoking electoral motives for 
politicians’ mimicking behaviour (i.e. yardstick competition and reference point effects) find 
only moderate support in our data.  In contrast to previous findings, the presence of the spatial 
pattern is indeed only weakly related to the political situation in the Flemish municipalities.   
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  Table 1: Summary statistics for control variables (N=301) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
SF-Mean 81.914 10.504 31.532 96.619 
Income 11.172 1.455 7.447 15.771 
Homeowners 74.827 7.062 48.179 90.001 
Population concentration 5.133 4.324 0.569 31.358 
Amalgamation 2.980 2.069 1 12 
Lagged public debt  1.278 0.522 0.270 4.340 
Grants 12.772 3.289 6.788 39.201 
Government fragmentation  1.777 0.744 1 5 
Ideological fragmentation 0.569 0.811 0 2.890 
Ideological position 5.007 0.592 2.7 6.1 
Note: All variables are measured in 2000, except homeownership (where – due to availability – 
data from 1991 where used) and the lagged level of public debt. 
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Table 2: Estimation results 
Variable OLS 
(1)
ML  
(2)
IV 
(3)
OLS 
(4)
ML  
 (5)
IV 
(6)
Intercept 23.909 ** 
(2.09) 
5.694 
(0.62) 
-8.714 
(-0.63) 
29.620 *** 
(4.42) 
13.063 ** 
(2.03) 
0.774 
(0.07) 
Income -0.150 
(-0.32) 
-0.080 
(-0.20) 
-0.025 
(-0.06) 
- - - 
Homeowners 0.465 *** 
(5.54) 
0.392 *** 
(5.47) 
0.335 *** 
(4.54) 
0.445 *** 
(5.70) 
0.360 *** 
(5.73) 
0.297 *** 
(4.27) 
Population 
concentration 
0.081 
(0.53) 
0.136 
(0.93) 
0.179 
(1.16) 
- - - 
Amalgamation -0.478 * 
(-1.86) 
-0.402 
(-1.61) 
-0.341 
(-1.40) 
-0.476 * 
(-1.92) 
-0.423 * 
(-1.78) 
-0.384 * 
(-1.65) 
Lagged public debt  -2.936 *** 
(-2.67) 
-2.450 *** 
(-2.74) 
-2.065 ** 
(-2.00) 
-2.864 *** 
(-2.70) 
-2.428 *** 
(-2.73) 
-2.104 ** 
(-2.10) 
Grants 1.837 *** 
(5.81) 
1.663 *** 
(9.73) 
1.526 *** 
(5.14) 
1.882 *** 
(6.62) 
1.698 *** 
(10.73) 
1.562 *** 
(5.67) 
Government 
fragmentation  
0.080 
(0.09) 
-0.007 
(-0.01) 
-0.076 
(-0.10) 
- - - 
Ideological 
fragmentation 
0.863 
(0.87) 
0.706 
(0.82) 
0.582 
(0.64) 
- - - 
Ideological position 1.092 
(0.87) 
0.942 
(0.91) 
0.824 
(0.74) 
- - - 
ρ - 0.305 *** 
(4.31) 
0.545 *** 
(3.47) 
- 0.299 *** 
(4.26) 
0.522 *** 
(3.27) 
 
R² 
Loglikelihood 
Moran I 
LM spatial lag test 
LM spatial error test  
Hansen J 
 
37.12 
 
2.857 *** 
13.194 *** 
2.829 * 
 
 
-1049.73 
 
42.21 
 
 
 
 
0.868 
 
36.76 
 
2.651 *** 
13.302 *** 
2.863 * 
 
 
-1050.74 
 
41.78 
 
 
 
 
1.457 
Note:  N = 301; robust t-statistics in brackets; ρ is the coefficient indicating a spatial lag in the dependent 
variable; *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  Moran’s I and (robust) LM 
tests are measures for spatial dependence in the residuals of the OLS regression.  Hansen J tests 
for over-identification of the instruments used (and has a Chi² distribution). 
 
 Table 3: Spatial lag models for different regimes 
 Variable Coalition Large coalitiona PPPb
>0,5 
Majorityc
>60% 
Majorityc
>65% 
Majorityc
>70% 
         Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
 
Intercept 
 
9.605 
(0.94) 
 
6.366 
(0.64) 
 
-3.433 
(-0.33) 
 
4.574 
(0.47) 
 
25.689 
(1.43) 
 
-1.665 
(-0.16) 
 
4.116 
(0.42) 
 
2.962 
(0.30) 
 
4.758 
(0.48) 
 
2.208 
(0.22) 
 
8.012 
(0.71) 
 
3.021 
(0.31) 
ρ 0.295 ***  0.295 *** 
(4.35) (4.42) 
0.370 *** 
(4.69) 
0.291 *** 
(4.38) 
0.022 
(0.11) 
0.360 *** 
(5.04) 
0.312 *** 
(4.69) 
0.304 *** 
(4.58) 
0.291 *** 
(4.28) 
0.313 *** 
(4.73) 
0.268 *** 
(3.04) 
0.318 *** 
(4.78) 
 
N 
 
187 
 
114 
 
38 
 
263 
 
42 
 
259 
 
123 
 
178 
 
76 
 
225 
 
44 
 
257 
 
Loglikelihood 
t-test (ρ1 = ρ2) 
 
 
-1050.12 
-0.01 
 
-1050.23 
-1.62 
 
 
-1050.57 
1.57 
 
-1050.82 
-0.43 
 
-1050.47 
0.98 
 
-1051.31 
0.74 
Note:  N = equals number of observations in each subsample; t-statistics in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and 
* at 10%; t-test (ρ1 = ρ2) attests the statistical significance of the difference of the spatial parameter in both subsamples. 
a ‘Large coalition’ refers to coalitions with more than two parties 
b ‘PPP’ indicates proportion of parties with representation in the local council that is part of the governing majority 
c ‘Majority’ designates the seat share of the ruling government 
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